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THE MODEL ACT'S DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS INTO RULE-MAKING AND
CONTESTED CASES
Ralph r. Fuchst

F OR the

purpose of prescribing minimum procedural requirements
for administrative agencies, the Model Administrative Procedure
Act in effect divides their proceedings into the now-familiar categories
of rule-making and adjudication, the latter being designated as proceedings in contested cases. Although these categories have long been
conventional in discussions of administrative procedure, their utility
has been questioned-not without reason if precise, unvarying procedural consequences attach to the assignment of a given proceeding
to one category or the other. For the differences that exist among such
varied instances of administrative rule-making as the imposition of a
local contagious disease quarantine and the fixation of minimum wages
in an industry or of maximum interest rates on bank deposits are surely
more significant for procedural purposes than the resemblances; and
the same may be said as to such variant "adjudications" as the disposition of an application for old age assistance, the determination with
regard to a certificate of convenience and necessity for a bus line, and
the decision of a professional disbarment proceeding. It behooves us to
inquire, therefore, whether the model act is not rendered rmsound and
unworkable by its attempt to lump together such diverse elements and
to legislate for them en masse.
The answer to our inquiry depends, of course, upon two factors: the
definition which the act gives to the categories in question and the use
which it proceeds to make of them.
As to the first factor, the act is at least verbally specific. " 'Rule'
includes every regulation, standard, or statement of policy or interpretation of general application and future effect, including the amendt A.B., LL.3B., 1922, Washington University; Ph.D., 1925, Robert Brookings
Graduate School; J.S.D., 1935, Yale University. Member of the Special Committee
on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act; Member of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Professor of Law, University of
Indiana.
1 Timberg, Administrative Findings of Fact, 27 WAsm U. L. Q. 62, 76-9 (1941);
of. Davis, The Bequirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative
Process, 51 YALE L. J. 1093, 1112-8 (1942).
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ment or repeal thereof, adopted by an agency ...to implement or make
specific the law enforced or administered by it or to govern its organization or procedure," except regulations concerning only an agency's internal management.2 " 'Contested case' means a proceeding before an
agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties
are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an
3
agency hearing. "
It has been pointed out that the distinction between these two types
of action may be quite formal and meaningless. 4 Railroad rate orders
identical in effect may, if governing statutes permit, be promulgated
either as general directions or as orders addressed to named railroads.
Why then attach significance for procedural purposes to a difference
that, being purely one of expression, ought not to have practical consequences? The objection has also been raised to classifying administrative proceedings into rule-making and adjudication, that such a division
is based upon separation-of-powers concepts. These, it is said, have no
application to proceedings conducted by a single agency, often through
the same set of officials. Why should procedural differences within an
agency turn upon the superficial resemblance of some of its functions
to those performed by legislatures and of others to those carried on by
courts 5
The answer to the first of the foregoing objections, which must be
more fully developed below, is that if legislation is to deal with administrative procedure on a statewide basis it must do so in terms of some
classification of proceedings, unless it is possible to lay down uniform
requirements, and that the classification adopted by the model act, even
though its basis is formal, is appropriate and useful. The answer to
the second objection turns upon the latter branch of the answer to the
first: the classification employed in the act must be judged on a practical
basis and not on the basis of its real or supposed resemblance to separation-of-powers categories. Any such resemblance is, if not wholly coincidental, at least entirely irrelevant. 6
2 MODE STATE Amm sTRATnw PaocznRn
AcT § 1(2). (Reprinted infra p. 372.)
Rule-mahlng is not defined; the act refers to the "adoption" of rules.
3 MODEL STATE ADm-ISTnATrvn PROCEDURE AcT 5 1(3).
4 Timberg, supra note 1, at 79; Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American
Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L. J. 538, 545 (1938).
5Davis, supra note 1, at 1113-6.
6It
is, of course, true that the exercise of "quasi-legislative"
and "quasijudicial" powers by agencies in the executive branch of government has been thought
to be anomalous because of its seeming violation of the separation of powers. and
that it has frequently been set down as the distinguishing characteristic of administrative, as over against ordinary executive, agencies. 59 A. B. A. R.EP. 541
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Before the attempt is made to deal with the specific merits and demerits of the classification into rule-making and adjudication, notice
should perhaps be taken of the possible objection that this classification
is bad because any separation of administrative proceedings into broad
categories would be bad.7 In this view, the evil lies in legislating for
administrative procedure on a general basis at all, since any attempt
to do so necessarily involves lumping unlike things together and imposing a harmiful uniformity upon them. Regulation of insurance is
unlike regulation of banking, and both are vastly different from public
health regulation and the administration of social security. Why not
recognize, then, that the differences are more significant than the resemblances and leave the regulation of procedure to statutes that operate
separately within each field of administration and that can be adapted
to the circumstances actually existing there? Commissioner Robert M.
Benjamin stated this view convincingly in his report on Administrative
Adjudication in New York, coming to the following conclusion:
Aly description of diversity in existing procedure has, I
believe, shown more than the extent of change that a general
procedural code would bring about. It has shown that much
of the existing diversity exists for reasons that are not merely
valid but inescapable. Thus a uniform procedure would be
impossible, if it were thought desirable.8
(1934). Of. Fuchs, supra note 4, at 541-3, 548, 550; Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N. 0. L. Rzv. 183-6, 193-4 (1940). Administrative rule-making
and administrative adjudication have been singled out for investigation partly because they have been considered functions that were questionable from a separationof-powers standpoint. REPORT or THE Comum=rER ON MINISTERS' POWERS, Cmd.
4060 at p. v (1932) (the Committee's "Terms of Reference"). That the separation
of powers has no relation to the allocation of rule-making and adjudication among
the departments of government and that the performance of these functions within
the executive branch cannot be considered a distinguishing mark of administrative
agencies iqpart of the thesis of Fuchs, supra. Historically these functions have
long been performed by agencies in the executive branch. Cf. FIAL REPORT or
ox ADums TRATIvE PRoCEDURE 7-11, 97-100
THE ATTORNEy GENERAL'S CoSmiTTEr
(1941). Notwithstanding their frequent coexistence, they may be distinguished
for purposes of study-although it may, of course, be contended that the distinction
is not a useful one. See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Bule-Making, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 259 (1938).
26 NEB. L.
7See Cohen, Legislative Injustice and the Spremdoy of "Law,"
Rnv. 323, 344 (1947); Remarks of Frederick K. Beutel, Public Forum of the
Federal Bar Ass'n, on Administrative Law and Procedure, 6 FED. BAR ASS'N 1.
264 (1945), 12 X. 0r BAR Ass' or D. 0. 279 (1945).
A i)INISTRATIvE ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK 35 (1942). Mr.
81 BinwAoImu,
Benjamin doubtless had in mind, however, a more detailed code of procedure than
that contained in the model act, which he played a helpful advisory role in framing.
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One cannot, I think, refute this view as to any governmental unit in
which legislation is sufficiently well drafted, with enough conscious
thought of procedural considerations, to result fairly consistently in
statutes that provide clear, fair, and workable procedures for their administration. Even the best standardized suit of clothes is probably
inferior to one that is expertly tailored to fit the particular wearer. So
it must be in regard to the adjective side of laws establishing administrative agencies. And legislative methods falling considerably short of
perfection may nevertheless yield statutory procedures that work better
in particular fields if they are not subjected to a general code than will
a legislative scheme that casts administrative procedures even partly
into a single mold. This observation may be true of the federal system,
which may come to suffer more than it will-benefit from the operation
of the new Administrative Procedure Act ;" and the same might be true
of the State of New York. Recognition of such a possibility in any state
is implicit in the fact that it is a model act, not a uniform act, we are
discussing. 9 As such the act is not urged upon the states for adoption
but is offered for their use in whole or in part, in the belief that its
provisions will be found workable and in many instances will result in
improvements as compared to the operation of previous legislation.
In most American states, as is well known, legislation has on the whole
been far from expertly drafted. From the standpoint of administrative
procedure, the results leave considerable to be desired. This is true even
from the practical standpoint of a lawyer attacking a problem, as agaiist
the somewhat academic approach of procedural "surveyors" who, when
they attempt to gain an over-all comprehension of administrative processes in a state, are bewildered and baffled by the diversity confronting
them. 9 In actual operations no one needs to learn all of the administrative procedures of a state. Rarely is the lawyer confronted with more
than one set of procedures at a time. Even over a period, he and his
client engaged in a business can probably get along with knowledge of
the ways of four or five agencies at most-knowledge which it is fairly
easy to come by, if not through books then through inquiry and corressa 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-11 (Supp. 1946).
9 Uniform acts are urged upon the states for adoption in order to bring about
uniformity in the law of the subjects covered, usually for economic, social, or administrative reasons; model acts, likewise prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, are proposed for adoption when desirable. Cf. HANDBooK OF THE NATONAL CoNFEREmcE oF comMIssIoNERS Ox UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FnIF-THII

AN'uAL CoNFERoE 144,

146 (1943) and, as to the Administrative Procedure Act in particular, id. at 83-6.
issSioN To THE GoVERNOR AND GEN1 oREPORT Or TEE ADmnsTRArIVE LAw Co
ERAL ASSEmBLY oF THE STATE OF Omo 10, 63 (1942).
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pondence.11 Mere variety in the administrative procedures prevailing
in a state therefore hardly affords a reason for tampering with them by
general legislation. The difficulties that exist in most states, however,
go beyond the existence of differences, whether needless or not. They
extend to the absence from some statutes of provisions enabling suitable
hearings to be held or insuring opportunity for prompt determination
of questions of legal right, as well as the presence in statutes of unwise
12
provisions limiting or needlessly enlarging judicial review.
In areas of administration in which such procedural deficiencies exist,
the application of the model act should confer considerable benefit. The
same benefit would flow in larger measure from careful, piece-by-piece
revision of state regulatory statutes, having in mind the policies embodied in the model act and also the needs of sound administration in
the fields with which particular statutes deal-such a job as was done,
for example, in the revision of the New York Insurance Law as a result
of the elaborate study directed by Professor Patterson of the Columbia
University School of Law. 13 Short of such major operations, a good
deal of improvement might be accomplished by mere textual revision
of statutes after discussions with administrators and with affected interests in the light of general considerations bearing upon administrative
procedure. Such developments are not to be expected on a large scale
in the predictable future, however-not so long as state legislatures lack
adequate staff services or, in bad years, the funds to provide them. The
question here is, therefore, whether in the absence of better remedies
such improvement as the model act may accomplish will be purchased
at too high a price in terms of difficulty of application and harmful
restriction of some administrative proceedings because of the act's
" Compare, however, the statement of Dean Vanderbilt that

"...

it is not only

difficult but actually impossible in many instances to determine what is the existing law of the administrative agencies." IN. Y. U. SCHOOL o LAW INST. PROc., THE
FEDERAL ADMINisTRATIVE PROEDURE ACT AND TH AnumizsTRATIV AGENCIES at
p. iii (Warren ed. 1947). Dean Vanderbilt's statement embraces substantive as
well as procedural regulations, however, and is strikingly true as to the former,
more frequently than as to the latter, in relation to some state agencies.
12 See, e.g., the inadequate notice provisions in some of the statutes authorizing
license revocation proceedings, outlined in JunicrAL CouuNar OF CALIFORNIA, TENTH
BIENNIAL REPORT 78 (1944). See also the same report's summary of available
judicial review proceedings in California at 133-45.

The REPORT or THE ADMINISTRATIvE LAw COMMISSION TO THE GOvERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
or Omo 62 n. 10 (1942) states that 22 of the 62 statutes in that state authorizing
license revocation made no provision for a hearing. As to the desirability of according a hearing in license revocation, see 1 BENJAMIN, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 104-5.
13 See BENJAMIN, The Istrance Department 5 in 2 ADMINISTRATIvE ADnJUIcATION IN NEW Yorx (1942).
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adoption of the broad categories of rule-making and proceedings in contested cases.
The formulation of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act encountered the difficulty that the categories of rule-making and adjudication as employed in the preliminary stages of drafting yielded unsatisfactory results. At that stage these categories were defined substantially
as are those of the model act.14 Procedural requirements were stated
for each category. Objections were raised by government agencies to
which the draft was sent for comment, to the effect that requirements
which the act attached to adjudication would present serious difficulties
when applied to some of their proceedings falling within that category.21
The solutions adopted were (1) so to broaden the definition of rulemaking and correspondingly to narrow the definition of adjudication
as to throw these proceedings into the former category,' 6 and (2) to
limit most of the requirements for adjudication to instances "required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for agency
hearing," instead of simply after opportunity for hearing.' 7 The requirements as to procedure in rule-making, even when required to b6
on the record after opportunity for hearing, were at the same time so
formulated as to be free of the objections raised against the former
DImmsTrATIVE PRoCEuRE AcT, SEN. fDoo. No.
14 LEGISLATIVE HISToY or THE
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 156-7 (1946): "1(c) 'Rule' means the whole or any part of
any agency statement of general applicability designed to implement, interpret,
or prescribe law or policy .... 'Rule making' means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (d) 'Order' means the whole or any part of
the fnal disposition or judgment . . . of any agency, and 'adjudication' means its
process, in a particular instance other than rule making but including licensing."
The draft's principal procedural requirements for adjudication were attached to
only such proceedings as are ". . . required by statute to be determined after
opportunity for an agency hearing .... " (§ 5 of federal act).
'5 Foster, Application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Statutes Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission in op. cit. supra note 11,
at 217-20; Remarks of Howard E. Wahrenbrock and Walter B. Wooden, Public
Forwm of the Federal Bar Ass'n on Administrative Law and Procedure, 12 J. or
BAR Ass'N op D. C. 361, 368 (1945); Carusi, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in op. cit. supra note
11, at 292-3 (but see Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 670, 683-4, 699-702 (1947)); of.
testimony of Clyde B. Aitchison, Commissioner, Imterstate Commerce Commission,
and James Lawrence Mly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, in Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sen. 674, Sen.
675, and Sen. 918, Part 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 450-2, 239-41 (1942).
t6 SEx. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 283 (1946) (§ 1(c) of act). The
language of the changes is stated in the text below.

'7Id at 4, 21, 219, 226 (first sentence of § 5 of federal act).
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adjudicative procedure."' In addition, the action of agencies upon initial
license applications was excepted from some of the requirements attaching to other forms of adjudication upon the record after opportunity
for hearing.' The act emerged with five major categories of proceedings
to which procedural requirements were attached: rule-making required
by the provisions of other statutes to be upon the record after opportunity for hearing; rule-making not attended by such a requirement;
adjudication required to be upon the record after opportunity for hearing; initial actions upon license applications required by other statutes
to be taken upon the record after opportunity for hearing; and adjudication not required to be upon the record after opportunity for hearing.
In the process of adaptation of the act, rule-making""a was transformed
from a category of proceedings eventuating in general prescriptions into
a class which includes, as well, proceedings that lead to agency "statements" of "particular applicability and future effect," ' 20 including all
instances of "approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations,
'2
costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing." 1
s Ird.

at 6, 30, 32, 221 (last sentences of §§ 7(c) and 8(a) of federal act).

10 Ibid.; id. at 4, 24, 220, 262 (last sentence of § 5(e) of federal act).

Proceedings to recover reparation from public utilities and carriers were also excepted
from § 5(c).
zga Rule making is defined in § 2(c) of the federal act.
20No attention is given in this discussion to the words "future effect," which
are included in both the federal act's and model act's definitions of "'rule." Their
meaning is unclear and it is difficult to envisage practical consequences that might
attach to them. They do not exclude interpretative regulations, which are specifically included and which do have future as well as retroactive effect. They do not
distinguish rules from specific orders which, like judgments, also necessarily operate
in futuro. Probably the intention, not aptly translated into words, is to distinguish
pronouncements which are thought to rest mainly upon policy considerations applicable to the future, including all general rules and, in the federal act, many
pronouncements of "particular applicability," from those that rest upon considerations relating to past conduct, like cease-and-desist orders. Under the federal
act some distinction not based on the form of agency statements is necessary, or
else the category of rule-making swallows up that of adjudication. In the model
act, on the other hand, "rule" is adequately defined without reference to the words
"future effect," which seem to add nothing.
21 The federal act allows great procedural freedom with reference to both rulemaldug and adjudication not required by other statutes to be based upon a record
after opportunity for hearing. As to proceedings that must be so based, rulemaling as defined and the determination of applications for initial licenses are
freed from the following mandatory requirements, applicable, with minor exceptions,
to formal adjudication: nonconsultation by the hearing officer with any person
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In the face of this history, it is natural to ask thether the simplicity
of the classification retained in the model act is not delusive. Conceptually fairly clear, it could nevertheless be a cover for strange bedfellows
in the procedural lodging. And so, it must be conceded, it is; but the
bed is not so Procrustean as to preclude adaptation to the needs of the
various denizens who must lie upon it; and it does afford a foundation
for somewhat greater repose than in recent years has attended the attempts of administrative procedure to settle down to a satisfactory state
of affairs. Justification of this conclusion requires analysis, first, of the
procedural requirements that give trouble if too great uniformity is
attempted, and second, of the precise requirements which the model act

imposes.
' The most striking difficulties envisaged by the federal agencies with
regard to the original draft of the federal act related largely to two
points: the "separation" requirement for adjudication which threatened
to insulate hearing officers and deciding authorities in certain types of
cases too largely from sources of needed information and advice within
their agencies, 22 and the requirement that, in, cases where a formal adjudicatory or rule-making hearing is held by an official other than the
final deciding authority, the decision must be based upon an initial
or recommended decision by the hearing officer, to the exclusion of a
tentative decision prepared by other officials and without possibility of
omitting such a preliminary determination altogether. 23 A single reason
lay behind both of these objections--namely, the need of bringing to
bear in certain situations the full resources of agency staffs. These staffs
are assembled for the very purpose of supplying knowledge and expert
judgment in the handling of critical matters. If their contributions in
formal proceedings must be brought into play by the process of testimony
in open hearings and must filter through to the deciding authorities
principally by means of a document prepared by the hearing officer,
serious obstacles are placed in the way of mobilizing the agencies' full
resources in reaching conclusions.
As matters have been worked out in the federal act, the bulk of the
administrative proceedings to which staff contributions need to be made
as to any fact in issue, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate, together with nonparticipation at the hearing stage or afterward, except
as witness or counsel, of agency personnel engaged in investigative or prosecuting
functions in the same or a related case (0 5(c)); freedom to each party to present
his case by oral or documentary evidence as he sees fit (§ 7(c)); formulation by
the hearing officer of either an initial or a recommended decision (§ 8(a)).
22 See note 21 supra.
23 Ibid.
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are defined as rule-mtking" or, if they present instances of initial
action upon license applications, are specifically excepted from the objectionable requirements attaching to other types of formal adjudication. 25 In these proceedings, whether they eventuate in general prescriptions or in orders of particular applicability, as well as in all other
instances of rule-making upon the record after hearing, the hearing
officer and the deciding authority may consult with other members of
the staff of the agency; and the agency may dispense with any intermediate report upon finding "that due and timely execution of its
functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires" or, without such
a finding, may substitute a tentative decision prepared in some other
way for an initial or recommended decision by the hearing officer. In
this way, a measure of procedural flexibility is provided and the way
is left open for the knowledge and judgment of agency staff members
to come into a proceeding through various forms of advice and through
26
a tentative decision in which many may have collaborated.
The model act does not contain procedural requirements giving rise
to the more serious difficulties mentioned above, which arose out of the
original draft of the federal act. Like the federal act draft, it does not
attach the hearing requirement to rule-making. Unlike the latter, it
does not, except in one minor respect, contain the provisions attaching
to adjudication and formal rule-making, the inclusion of which in the
federal draft was said to threaten difficulty in proceedings originally
subject to strict adjudicative procedure. There is no prohibition of
consultation by hearing officers and deciding authorities with agency
staff members. It is provided in Paragraph (2) of Section 9 that "All
evidence, including records and documents in the possession of the
agency of which it desires to avail itself, shall be offered and made a
part of the record in the case, and no other factual information or evidence shall be considered in the determination of the case"; but it is
clear that this provision does not bar the possibility of consultation as
to policies and general knowledge. 27 Although Section 10 does not permit a recommended or tentative decision to be omitted entirely in cases
in which "a majority of the officials of the agency who are to render
the final decision have not heard or read the evidence," it lays down
no requirement as to the personnel that shall prepare the "proposal for
decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law," which must
%4Text at note 21 supra, p. 216.
2a Note 19 supra and text supra,.p. 216.
20 For a fuller discussion see Reich, Administratve Procedure ACt: Analysis of
Its Requiremcnt as to Bule-Making, 33 A.B.A.J. 315 (1947).
27 Of. the provisions as to official notice, below.
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be served upon the parties in order to afford them opportunity "to file
exceptions and present argument to a majority of the officials who are
to render the decision . . . ." The agency may invoke the services of
such staff members as it desires.
Avoidance of the pitfalls that beset the drafters of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act is, however, a negative virtue in the model
act. To establish the value of the model act's classification of administfative proceedings, it is necessary to consider its specific provisions in
relation to the agency functions that fall within each of its broad
categories.
As to procedure leading to the adoption of rules, the act contains no
requirement whatever, except the provision of Section 5 that any interested person may petition an agency for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any rule and that each agency shall provide a procedure for the submission, consideration, and disposition of such petitions. Each agency is admonished in Paragraph (3) of Section 2, however, "so far as practicable, in its discretion," to "publish or otherwise
circulate notice" of the intended issuance of regulations, other than
those concerning only its internal management, and to "afford interested,
persons opportunity to submit data or views orally or in writing."
Section 3 provides that such regulations are not to become effective until
filed with the secretary of state or other designated official; and Section
4 provides for the publication of administrative regulations by the same
official in periodical bulletins and in standing compilations.
The procedure in contested cases, or adjudications required to be made
"after an [opportunity for] agency hearing," is prescribed in Sections
8 to 11. Opportunity for hearing shall be given by reasonable notice,
which shall specify the issues involved if this is feasible at that stage.
If notice of the issues is not feasible at that stage, or if the issues are
amended later, they are to be "fully stated as soon as practicable."
Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to present evidence and argument. An official record, including all evidence, shall be prepared; but
documentary evidence may be received and incorporated by reference;
and transcription of shorthand notes is not required "unless requested
for purposes of rehearing or court review." Evidence may be admitted
and given effect when it "possesses probative value commonly accepted
by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." "Incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence" may
be excluded. "Every party" shall have the right to cross-examine "the
witnesses who testify" and to submit rebuttal evidence. No "factual
information or evidence" may come in except via the record; but, upon
due notice and opportunity for rebuttal, agencies "may take notice of
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jhdicially cognizable facts and . . . of general, technical, or scientific
facts within their specialized knowledge; and they "may utilize their
ex'perience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the
evaluation of the evidence presented to them." Unless "a majority of
the officials of the agency who are to render the final decision" have
"not heard or read the evidence," the decision may follow the initial
hearing without further proceedings; but if a majority of deciding
officials must learn of the case at second hand, the "proposal for decision" procedure previously mentioned must be followed. A majority
of deciding officials must then receive argument and "personally consider the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by the
parties." Provision is made, however, for the optional exemption of
agencies by name from the proposal-for-decision procedure. Decisions
shall "be in writing or stated in the record and shall be accompanied
by findings of fact and conclusions of law"; and parties shall be notified
of them in person or by mail, with complete copies upon request.
The act contains no provision for judicial review of rules, which is
left to pre-existing procedures; but provision is made in Section 12 for
petitions to court to secure review of decisions in contested cases, with
an optional provision to preserve additional methods of review afforded
by pre-existing law. The scope of review in the proceedings authorized
by the act is set out in Paragraph (7) of Section 12. It adheres to the
formula which has now become general, except possibly for the provision that a decision may be reversed or modified if it is "unsupported
by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire
record as submitted."
Here, it is submitted, is a set of statutory provisions designed realistically to work improvement in the administrative procedures of numerous agencies in many states without imposing hampering restrictions,
and to secure a due measure of judicial.review of decisions with recognition of the expertness that should reside in the administrative process.
Contributing materially to the structure thus created is the separation
of rule-making from the decision of contested cases, coupled with the
procedural freedom allowed as to the former and the imposition of
fundamental requirements upon the latter which yet permit considerable
flexibility. Some drawbacks are present in the scheme, as will appear;
but they are a minor price to pay for the contribution the scheme can
make to administration.
The reasons for according procedural freedom in rule-making, stemming from the nature of the operations involved in formulating general
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regulations, have been stated before2s and need only be outlined briefly
here. The content of regulations necessarily lies partly in the discretion
of the agency devising them, since the very reason for authorizing their
issuance instead of incorporating fixed rules in the governing statutes
is to enable administrative judgment to shape them. The permissible
content of most regulations is subject to great variation, with a multiplicity of choices lying within the limits of possibility. Many recurring
situations will be governed by the regulations, and consequently affected
interests are likely to be numerous and not always identifiable as individuals whom it is possible to summon to meetings. Hence the questions presented in a rule-making proceeding are both numerous and
many-sided. Rarely are they susceptible to yes-or-no answers, and the
technique of litigation is ill-adapted to resolving them. Inquiry and
discussion, rather than trial and decision, are the primary methods to
be employed; but just how these are to be carried on varies from problem to problem. Occasionally the impact of regulations upon specific
interests is sufficiently clear and direct to warrant according some of
the rights of litigants to those interests; but for the most part the field
investigation or the questionnaire and the conference, rather than testimony and cross-examination followed by a verdict, form the preferable
way of reaching a result. No suitable method, from the most exploratory
to the most litigious, is barred from use in rule-making by the model act.
The door must be kept open to interested persons to request action and
the text of regulations must be officially available; but beyond these
requirements the choice of method in rule-making is left to the agencies
by the act.
It might be argued that differentiation within rule-making should be
attempted in such a'procedural statute as the model act, so as to require
regulations to be based upon the record of hearings in wage- and pricefixing, and kindred types of action, since such a hearing requirement
has become fairly common in statutes vesting such functions in administrative agencies. But it is as yet far from certain that a desirable
procedural pattern has been evolved in relation to such functions. 29 In
any event, the statutes bestowing such powers are not so numerous as
28 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CO M£rLTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE

PROcEDuRE 229 (1941) (note to § 209(g)' of the bill proposed by the minority).
For the same reasons, the majority's bill contained no requirements as to rulemaking procedure. Chapter VII of the Report contains an account of'the variety
of procedures actually employed in federal administrative rule-making. The pattern
in the states is substantially similar.
29 See Fuchs, Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case with
Respect to Procedure and Judicial Review in Administrative Ru1e-Making, 27 WAsH.
U. L. Q. 1 (1941); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520-1 (1944).
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to discourage specific revision for the purpose of introducing any needed
procedural changes; and, indeed, most of them are of sufficiently recent
origin to have had considerable thought given to procedure in their
The model act, therefore, properly leaves prooriginal formulation.
cedure in these fields to further experimentation at the hands of legislatures and' administrative bodies.
Some of the same factors as form the basis of procedural freedom in
rule-making are present in some of the proceedings classified as adjudication, as was emphasized in the preparation of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. The regulation of utility rates; the issuance of
certificates of convenience and necessity or of authorizations to establish
new banks; decisions as to appropriate units for collective bargaining
in labor relations ;31 and decisions as to the soundness of issues of securities or of the financial condition of regulated corporations may involve
policy questions similar to those in rule-making. Often general considerations, involving more than the particular case, form the principal
question for decision. Here, it may be argued, the agency is hampered
if its procedure is confined to the methods of adjudication, and it should
therefore be as free as in rule-making to rely upon procedures that will
3o Attention has been given to procedure in rule-making only in recent years and
has accompanied both administrative practice and the formulation of economic
ATTORNEY GENEAL's
regulatory legislation during that time. REPORT OF '
COMM TTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 101 n. 28 (1941); cases cited in Fuchs,

supra note 29. State minimum wage regulation has been largely revived in new
statutes since the decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
which overruled earlier cases holding such measures to be unconstitutional. Regulation of the interest rates and practices of commercial banks is older and is condtcted informally, but has given rise to few procedural problems. BENJAmIN, The
Banking Department 8-10, 52 in 2 A ssrsTA'nrvn AIjuDIAmON Ir NEW YORK
(1942). Price focing applicable to marketing of agricultural products and service
trades has been established by statutes of recent date which generally contain
detailed procedural provisions. See the summaries in WORKS PROGRESS ADmmiSTRATION, STATP PRICE CONTROL LEGSLATION, 2 MARKETING LAWS SUavLT 385-494

(1940).
a"The real nature of the issues in some "adjudication" is highlighted by the
involvement of the question of mandatory recognition of foremen's unions by employers in certain cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT.
449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. ff 151-166 (1940). The history of the question prior to its
resolution by Congress in the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, § 14(a),
Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 23, 1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(a) (Supp.
July 1947); is sketched in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492
(1947). Whether or not the issue is more properly one for legislative determination
as contended in the dissenting opinion and in Jaffe, An ,ssay on Delegation of
Legislative Power, 47 CoL. L. REv. 359, 370 (1947), it is susceptible of determination
administratively in either rule-making or adjudicative proceedings, depending upon
which type is legiplatively authorized.
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procure the data needed for sound decisions. But the conclusion is a
,on sequitur. In such cases the fate of specific parties necessarily has
been placed in issue and demands procedural protection, even while the
need exists for methods that are suited to the broader questions involved.
The two are not inconsistent, since the procedure for contested cases
does not preclude the effective use of studies and investigations, the
results of which may come into the record, or, if sufficiently general,
may be used to enrich that "technical competence and specialized kmowledge" which the agency is authorized to employ in reaching a decision.
It is precisely at this point that the model act shows its greatest strength.
At the same time as procedural protections are accorded to the parties
involved, the way is left open for documentary material, official notice,
and expert knowledge to guide the discretionary determinations that
need to be made.
Even the most clearly adjudicative type of proceeding, like many
cases in court, may in reality involve primarily, or at least as a prominent secondary consideration, the determination of some question of
general policy. Thus in a workmen's compensation case the issue of
whether the accident arose out of or in the course of the employment
often turns, not upon a conclusion as to the facts of the particular case,
but upon whether a given type of situation, such as the injury produced
by a scuffle with a fellow employee or the injury incurred on the way
to work, should be held to be covered. The major premise for the decision, and not just the minor, is up for consideration. 32 The facilities
for its wise determination should be available so far as possible in whatever type of proceeding it arises; and any legislation which introduces
procedural safeguards to affected interests, whether specific or general
in its coverage, should be framed with consciousness of the danger of
attaching blinders to eyes that should see policy clearly. The model act
is no exception in this regard; but neither has it succumbed to the
danger. The liberal standard as to admissibility of evidence; the limitation of the guaranty of the right of cross-examination to witnesses who
testify, thus excluding the guaranty as to the compilers of documents
32 The issue formally drawn in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1575, 1760
(1947), is whether a new major premise, not previously announced, was properly
made a basis of decision by the SEC in that case. The opinion of the Court when
the case was previously before it left that question in doubt. 318 U.S. 80, 86-95
(1943). The second opinion of the Court enunciates a broad charter for administrative agencies to adopt general regulations or to develop policy case by case in
their discretion, to the extent that legislative authorization permits. They have
done so throughout their history. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407, 416-21, 437-8 (1942).
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and reports unless they testify orally;13 and the broad provisions for
official notice and use of technical competence and specialized knowledge, 3' do much to harmonize the hearing procedure in contested cases
with the needs of policy determination.
It is true that the act requires a full-record proceeding, accompanied
by a limited array of formalities, in all instances in which a right to
a hearing in connection with an adjudication is secured by statute and
an informal disposition is not reached. The very term "contested case,"
which is applied to all such proceedings, is suggestive of an atmosphere
and of characteristics that often should be avoided and in some instances
are repugnant to the purpose of the governing. statutes and their administration. In social security administration generally and in manyfields of license issuance and revocation there is little or nothing in the
nature of a contest involved in making the determinations which the
statutes require. There is no interest adverse to the private interest that
is being advanced, but only a duty on the part of the agency to see to
it that statutory conditions to the enjoyment of benefits are fulfilled.
33 Due procedure may in particular situations, of course, require an opportunity
for parties adversely affected to cross-examine the author of written evidence,
whether or not the right is secured by statute. The relevant principle is expressed
in the Senate and House reports upon the Federal Administrative Procedure Bill
with reference to the last sentence of § 7(c). SEN. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 208-9, 271 (1946). The extent to which the recent tendency to broaden the
admissibility of official documents and reports even in judicial proceedings carries
with it diminution of the opportunity for cross-examination depends partly upon
the conception of what constitutes such admissible material. Compare the broad
wording of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, Rule 515,
admitting reports made by officials in the performance of their "functions," with
the conception expressed in Amory v. Commonwealth, 72 N.E. 2d 549 (Mass.
1947), restricting admissibility to material requiredby law to be published. As
to admissibility in administrative proceedings, of. 1 BEXJAm, A.mmI16RATI E
ADJUDIOATION iN Nnw YoRx 176-7, 197-8, 200-5 (1942); Davis, An Approach to
Problvms of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 397-401
(1942); Hoyt, Some Practical Problems Met in the Trial of Cases Before Administrative Tribunals, 25 Mim. L. REv. 545 (1941).
34 These provisions, coupled with the requirement that all evidence be made of
record, point up the problem that would be present in any event, of what is
"tevidence" that must be introduced as such and what, on the other hand, is information suitable to be "noticed" or used as a basis for judgment by an administrative agency without having to come in as evidence. This problem has been
much discussed: e.g., I BENJArsns, op. cit. supra note 33, at 206-21; FINAL REPORT
ON ADmIrmsTRATvE PROCEDURE 71-3, 398op T=-, ArRnNEY GENER&L'S CoumI
403 (1941); GELLH RN, FEDERAL ADuINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 82-99 (1941); Davis,
supra note 33, at 402-16; BOARD or INvEsTIGATION AND RESEARCH, REPORT ON
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES op GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL, H. R. Doo. No. 678, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 70-8, 200-35 (1944).
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At the hearing stage as before, the agency may follow a policy of helpfulness rather than of opposition to the claimants before it. Even in
this type of situation, however, the act's safeguards may be useful; and
its requirements need not be onerous even in those simpler cases in
which, for example, recorded findings of fact and conclusions of law
seem hardly appropriate.
If the issues in a proceeding are simple and nontechnical, so may be
the notice of the hearing. Recording the testimony may seem a cumbersome formality when many small cases are heard; but it avoids duplication of hearings if the matter is carried farther and, without transcription, scarcely imposes an excessive burden. The right of cross-examination will rarely be asserted except where there is a genuine contest35
and can in any event be limited to reasonable scope. Like the notice, the
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be simple if the case itself
is--although here the forms will certainly be unnecessarily cumbersome
if all that can be done is to delineate the obvious: Mary Smith must
be found to be the mother of a dependent child, Katie Smith, maintaining a suitable family home for Katie and needing assistance in the
amount of $20.00 a month which, when added to all other income and
support available to the child, will produce an amount, having due
regard to the resources and necessary expenditures of the family, sufficient to provide Katie with a reasonable subsistence compatible with
decency and health-instead of simply receiving an award of the same
amount for Katie's support. But the form can be printed, with appropriate blanks. None of these procedural requirements seriously threatens the basically informal, nontechnical character of proceedings which
an agency wishes to conduct in a friendly manner, free of the characteristics of litigation.3
The safeguards which the act's contested case procedure accords to
affected private interests are at the same time substantial and by no
means certain of realization apart from the act's provisions. Specificity
35There may, for example, be rival claimants to survivors' benefits in workmen's compensation or other social security proceedings, or the agency itself may
feel called upon to oppose actively a claimant who is thought to give indications
of being a malingerer or impostor.
3s For the procedural policies deemed desirable in social security proceedings,
oN ADMINiSTRAsee Monograph (No. 16) of the ATTORrNE GNERAL's CoMnArr
TivE PnOanmum, ADmINIsTRATIvu PROEDURE iN GOVERNmENT AGENCIEs, PART 3,
SOCIAL SEcuxrr BOARD, SEN. D0o. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-8, 41-7, 49-50
(1941); testimony of Murray W. Latimer, Chairman, National Railroad Retirement
Board, in Hearings Before a Subcominmittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
Sen. 674, Sen. 675, and Sen. 918, Part 2, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 511-32 (1942).
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of notice of the issues to be met in particular is overlooked quite often ;"
here it is expressly enjoined and judicial review is readily available to
correct its omission.38 The requirement of Section 8 for rules of procedure is valuable and in no sense burdensome. The certainty that the
basis of decision will be embodied in a record affords a security against
obscurity which there is rarely reason to withhold.39 The requirement
of a proposal for decision in advance of the decision, in case he who
hears does not decide, has become elementary since the late thirties. 0
Its inclusion in the act sets a procedural pattern which is usually desirable 4 ' and may afford a basis for securing legislative appropriations
to provide the necessary personnel.
The scope of judicial review which the act provides is adequate and
probably as clear as a statutory formula can make it. The statutory
procedure is simple. By reliance upon the administrative record as the
37 See the discussion and the authorities cited in GELEoRN, ADm'ISTRATIvE
LAw, CASES AND ComENTS 263-80 (2d ed. 1947).
3SThe provision of § 12(7) of the act, limiting reversal of administrative decisions to situations in which '"the substantial rights of the petitioners may have
been prejudiced p" should prevent reversals for inadequate notice when timely
correction was afterward made or prejudice is not shown. ,
39 In at least one type of situation, however, the requirement that the decision
must be based upon a record may be unwise. In the licensing of banks and other
flnancial institutions the administrative agency is commonly directed to take into
account the character of the applicants and their capacity to engage in the business.
Inquiry into these matters can scarcely be conducted by the hearing method, nor
is it intended that it should be even when the governing statute provides for a
hearing as to other aspects of the problems presented. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN.
§9 18-222-5 (Burns 1933). Compare Ir. STAT. ANN. § 10.02 (Jones 1947); IowA
CODE §§ 524.11-3 (1946). IOWA CODE 9 534.9 (1946) relating to building and loan
associations, by providing for an appeal to court from a refusal of authorization,
contemplates that the grounds of refusal may be made a matter of record. Cf.
BENJAmIN, The Banking Department 12-24, 52-3 in 2 ADmrsTnATvn ADJUDIOATiON
IN NEw YoRK (1942).
-10 This is the apparently enduring result of the famous Morgan litigation (Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1
(1938))-in particular of Morgan I--after other pronouncements and holdings
of the
0 Court in Morgan I and Morgan I1 have been discounted in the light of
subsequent criticism or repudiation by the Court itself. Acceptance of the requirement has come about largely through administrative action and legislative
prescription.
-$Theexception provided in § 8(a) of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act for rule-making and determining applications for initial licenses, permitting
this procedural step to "be omitted in any case in which the agency finds upon
the record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires," is useful in complicated proceedings in which speed is required and the issues have been sufficiently aired in the initial hearing. The absence of a similar exception in the model act is not of great importance, however.
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basis for the reviewing court's action, economy of effort is achieved. In
only one respect is any questionable threat likely to be found in the
review provisions to effective administration in any of the proceedings
that are grouped under the heading of contested cases. The power of
a court to reverse or modify the administrative conclusion because of
lack of support by "competent, material, and substantial evidence upon
the whole record as submitted" extends to the foundation for "inferences, conclusions, or decisions" as well as "findings." In proceedings
in which a discretionary determination has been made, opportunity is
thus given to the reviewing court to rule out as baseless in the evidence
a conclusion of policy (such as the undesirability of permitting abandonment of a railroad station) for which the court finds inadequate warrant.42 Such decisions should, of course, be subject to a measure of judicial
review; but a court in overturning them should be compelled to assert
their arbitrariness or capriciousness as a basis for its action, rather
than being enabled to rely upon evidentiary legalisms. The act, however, as has been pointed out, stresses the permissible role of agency
"experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge" in the
administrative determination of such matters-a feature which should
strengthen the tendency to "judicial self-limitation" in performing the
reviewing function. In view of the terms of the act as a whole, the risk
is worth taking.
All in all, then, the model act's employment of the categories of rulemaking and adjudication appears to result in a workable procedural
scheme, imposing few restraints that are unduly restrictive. At the
same time it establishes desirable safeguards for affected interests,
coupled with efficient methods, in proceedings that call for care and
restraint. The freedom allowed in rule-making permits employment of
the safeguards otherwise attaching only to adjudication, where these
seem called for. No assumption is made that procedures in the performance of the two main types of functions are necessarily and inherently different. The need for procedures carefully designed to fit
particular problems can in all probability be met by most administrative
agencies in all but a few states more successfully under the terms of the
act than would be the case without it. Where adequate procedure already prevails, as is quite generally true, for example, of public utility
regulation and social security administration, the act will largely reaffirm existing practice; but exceptions can and should be made when
the act is adopted, so as to exclude agencies having a satisfactory procedure, if the act threatens impairment of their methods.
42 See, e.g., Illinois Central E .R. -v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 74 N.E. 2d 545
(Ill. 1947); of. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 395 Ill. 303,
70 N.E. 2d 64 (1946).

